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REVITALIZATION OF
THE JAPANESE BREWING INDUSTRY








The Japanese brewing industry has been changing dramatically. Since the end of
the second world war, the Japanese beer market had been expanding very rapidly, and
during this period, Kirin Breweries established the dominant position in the market.
In the 1970 s, the expansion slowed down, and the industry seemed to have matured in
the 1980's. However, in 1986, Asahi Breweries, the third biggest brewer of the four in
Japan at that time, caused the change. Asahi, which had lost market share for many
years, introduced two new products one after the other, and expanded their market
share from 9.9% in 1985 to 20.&% in 1988, becoming the second largest player in the
beer industry. Now, even Kirin is taking notice. Since then, the Japanese brewers
(Kirin, Asahi, Sapporo, Suntory) have been competing each other intensively, and as a
result, the beer market began to grow again. The ranking in the industry had not
changed for twenty years, and it was the　丘rst time for one brewer to increase its
market share by more than 10% in only two years. This is the interesting case of
the revitalization of the traditional matured industry.
The revitalization of the Japanese brewing industry was caused by successful chal-
lenge of Asahi, a follower in the industry. However, it is usually considered that a
leader is the strongest company in the industry and that follower's challenges hardly
succeed"'. That is becaus? the leader in one industry has more managerial resources
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(financial and human resource, reputation, and so on) than the followers. With these
abundant resources, a leader can compete with others advantageously. Moreover, there
are some industrial characteristics which enable a large company to grow larger. In
the industry with these characteristics, the leader broadens the lead and the followers'
challenges have little in月uence. The Japanese brewing industry seems to have such
characteristics. In fact, m spite of Asahi's various challenges, Kirin continued to ex-
pand its market share until 1970s. Nevertheless, in the latter half of the 1980's, why
did Asahi succeed in increasing its market share and revitalize the industry?
Since the late 1970 s, maturity of the traditional industries and their revitalization
have been broadly discussed. An important contribution to this discussion was made
by Abernathy's study on the development of the U. S. automobile industry in terms of
technological innovation (Abemathy; 1978). He found that as the industry matured,
major innovations decreased and minor ones became prevalent. In another study, he
also suggested that if some new technology develops, the existing technological system
is outdated and matured industry might be revitalized (Abernathy et al.; 1983). Since
then, several cases reported that high technologies such as microelectronics revitalized
matured industries'". Radical technological innovation could deteriorate the leader's
strength, intensify competition, and revitalize matured industries. However, the Japanese
brewing industry revitalized itself without radical technological change.
Asahi's new products were not based on new technology, but on new product
concept. This new product concept broke the existing belief about good beer and
made both brewers and consumers search for new good beer. This change intensi丘ed
competition in the industry and in turn the beer market began to grow again. It
suggests that even in the industry with the characteristics favorable for a leader,
under certain competitive pattern, followers'challenges are successful, and a leader lose
the competition. Moreover, although it sounds paradoxical, it is considered that Asahi
increased｡ its market share very rapidly and its success was not temporary because of
the industrial characteristics favorable for a leader. Therefore, the industrial character-
istics and the change of competitive pattern are the key for the follower to succeed
and consequently to revitalize the matured industry.
It is true that the organizational (cultural and structural) changes and the leader-
ship of top management were important for Asahi's success. However, m this paper,
we analyze the case in terms of the industrial characteristics and the strategies of the
brewers. The purposes of this paper are to write a brief case story of the revitahza-
tion of the Japanese brewing industry, to explain the reason for Kinn's dominance after
the second world war and Asahi's recent success consistently, and to study about com-
petitive patterns, industrial characteristics, and industrial evolution.
In this paper,丘rst of all, the history of the industry and Asahi's success are de-
scribed. Secondly, we丘nd out the characteristics of the industry that enabled Kirm to
continue to expand its market share and enjoy the dominant position. During the in-
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mistrial growth period it was important for a brewer to establish the reputation that
its beer is high quality beer and the beer of beer lovers, because the brewer with
the reputation can expand sales and expansion of sales can strengthen the reputation
even more. In other words, there are some "market leader advantages in the industry.
Third, we compare the competitive patterns between before and after the introduc-
tion of Asahi's new products in order to五nd out the reason for Asahi's success and
revitalization of the industry. Finally, we propose a view of an industry and competi-
tion which seems to be effective in order to study industrial evolution and growth of
the丘rm, and also propose some interesting research agenda.
II. THE CASE OF THE JAPANESE BREWING INDUSTRY(3)
(1) The History of the Industry
The Japanese brewing industry began in the 1860's. In the late nineteenth century,
the industry was composed of many small brewers. However, in order to stabilize tax
revenues from the industry, the Japanese government consolidated many small丘rms
into one big company, Dai Nippon. Dai Nippon enjoyed a dominant position holding
more than 70% of the market.
After the second world war, Dai Nippon was divided into Asahi and Sapporo,
governmental limits on beer production were abolished, and beer brands revived. Brew-
ers had to compete with each other. In 1950, the industry had three players, the
market share was 37% (Sapporo), 33. 5% (Asahi), and 29. 5% (Kirin). However, by 1954
Kirin became a market share leader (see丘gure 1). The initial success of Kirin was
caused by several reasons.
During that period, there were some initial conditions favorable for Kirin. Since
Dai Nippon was geographically divided into Asahi (western area) and Sapporo (eastern
area), Kirin was the only national player. The Kirin brand was known nationally,
while Asahi brand was little known in eastern area although it was popular in western
area. Kirin had factories all over Japan and could supply fresh beer nationally, while
Asahi could not do it because of its biased factory location.
In addition, of course, Kirin s effort and strategy contributed to its own success.
Kirin tried to improve the quality of beer by introducing new facilities and so on.
Kirm also gave priority to supplying urban areas and big cities. At that time consump-
tion in big cities was growing more rapidly than in the countryside, so Kirin could
expand its market share. Moreover, Kirin's good reputation in big cities spread na-
tionally as consumption in the countryside grew. For these reasons, Kirin expanded
their market share and established the reputation that "Kirin beer is of high quality
and the beer of beer lovers. '
From 1955　to 1963, the Japanese beer industry was in growth period. Although
every brewer could increase production, only Kinn could expand market share. In the
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Figure 1 BEER MARKET SHARE
1950　　1955　　　1960　　1965　　1 970　　1975　　1980　　1985
YEAR
蝣KIRIN　-　・SAPPOR0　- - ASAHI TAKARA SUNTORY
(SOURCE) Kirin Breweries, Kirin Beer no Rekishi, Nikkan Keizai Tsushinsha,
Shurm Shokuhm Sangyo no Seihin Hanbai Share.
1950's, Kirin expanded its production capacity more aggressively than other two brew-
ers. While Asahi and Sapporo began to build new factories in the 1960's when
demand began to increase, Kirm predicted increasing demand early and began to build
new factories in both 1955 and 1959. Without such aggressive capacity e甲ansion, Kirin
drinkers might have run into shortages and Kirm's good reputation might have been
deteriorated.
In the middle of the 1960s the growth of the market slowed. As Asahi and Sap-
poro had just built new factories at that time, their capacity utilization ratio went
down. To take advantage of excess capacity, they introduced new beer products in
order to exploit potential market. In 1963, Sapporo began to sell very large size bottle,
``Sapporo Giants, and Asahi began to sell strange shaped small size bottle, "Asahi
Steiny in 1964. 0n the other hand, Kirin ignored them and tried to expand capacity
of its lager brand. Although the new products of Sapporo and Asahi exploited potential
market to some extent, they also cannibalized the market share of existing product
lines. Moreover, they sold well at the outset, but they were not ordered repeatedly.
As a result, Kirin supplied its beer to the newly exploited market, and further ex-
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Figure 2　TRANSITION OF BEER MARKET GROWTH,























































































































































panded its market share.
At the same time, Asahi secretly changed the taste of its beer to imitate that of
Kinn beer. However, the imitation of Kirin beer did not attract Kirin drinkers. When
Asahi and Sapporo realized that imitation was not effective, they forced wholesalers to
give high rebates, and also tried to deteriorate Kirin's reputation by challenging adver-
tisement. However, these efforts did not succeed.
When Asahi and Sapporo realized that these strategies failed, they changed their
policy and began to sell draft beer with emphasis on the taste difference from Kirin's
lager beer. On the contrary, Kirin ignored draft beer and concentrated on existing
lager beer. While the consumption of draft beer grew gradually, the market share of
challengers did not go up, while Kirin recorded the highest market share, 62.%% in
1977.
In order to enlarge the demand for draft beer, Asahi began to sell draft beer in a
mini barrel in 1977. Kirin ignored it for a while, but when its market share stopped
increasing, Kirin began to sell mini barrels in 1981. Then, "Container Wars broke out
and each player competed in terms of size, shape, and the other attractiveness of the
barrel. As a result, competition shifted from taste difference between draft beer and
lager to attractiveness of ba汀els, and market share in the industry remained relatively
unchanged. The transition of market growth, market share of Kirin and Asahi, and
the strategies of each brewer are exhibited in figure 2.
(2) A細ihi's Success
In spite of various challenges by Asahi, its market share declined to 9. 9% in 1985,
and Asahi was afraid that it could not be viable in the market. However, the situa-
tion changed dramatically when Asahi began to sell two new kinds of beer, 〟Koku-Kire"
in 1986, and "Super Dry in 1987.
In the 1980's, Asahi formulated a corporate philosophy, began TQC activities, and
introduced a new corporate identity. Through these activities, Asahi realized that it
was necessary to develop new beer oriented to drinkers'taste. The marketing depart-
ment surveyed the taste of 5000 beer drinkers in 1984 and 1985. The survey revealed
that drinkers evaluated beer on the basis of "koku" (richness) and "kire" (sharpness).
So Asahi began to develop new beer with these two characteristics.
Although it was difficult to develop such a beer, CI and TQC facilitated the collab-
oration between marketing and production departments, and Asahi managed to develop
a new product. The new beer, called "Koku-Kire, was sold with a new label. Asahi
spent an extraordinary amount of money in advertisement and promotion. The com-
pany also paid attentions to the quality of beer by using good material and keeping
the beer as fresh as possible. For instance, old beer in the distribution channel was
regularly recalled and destroyed. Owing to these efforts, "Koku-Kire sold well, and
Asahi s market share recovered to 10. 4%.
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However, Asahi's challenge did not stop there. It began to sell another new beer,
called "Super Dry." "Super Dry was belonging to the same concept as that of "Koku-
Kire, but new beer had a sharper taste and higher alcoholic content than the latter.
"Super Dry' was a tremendous success and pushed Asahi's market share to 12.9%.
Other brewers, including Kirin, began to sell a dry-type beer in 1988, and the "Dry
Wars broke out. Unfortunately for Kirin, at the beginning of the year, newspapers
said that Kirin imitated Asahi in the package and the name of the new beer. More-
over, Kirin undervalued the growth of the dry beer market segment, and did not pre-
pare enough capacity for its dry-type beer in the spnng. Therefore, when retailers
tried to push Kirin's dry beer, they were short of it. These things helped Asahi estab-
lish the reputation of ``Super Dry as the champion of dry-type beer, and Asahi won
the war. As a result Asahi's market share rose to 20.&%.
When Asahi began to sell these two new products, it emphasized their taste was
different from Kirin's lager beer. The differentiation of taste was based on one hy-
pothesis - beer drinkers can be classified into older and younger generations. While
the former prefers the taste of Kirm's lager beer, the latter prefers a sharper taste,
however, selects Kirin only because of its reputation that Kinn beer is the beer o王
beer lovers. Which brand gets the reputation depends on which brand heavy drinkers
or, in other words, beer lovers drink. In the 1980's, demographicly, the younger genera-
tion made up a larger population of beer drinkers, therefore it was good time to offer a
new taste of beer and deteriorate Kinn's existing reputation.
There was another reason why Asahi introduced not only "Koku-Kire' but also
"Super Dry. Hitherto, Asahi's new products performed well initially, but they had no
staying power and were soon replaced by Kirin's lager beer. Asahi felt that "Koku-
Kire could not maintain the increase of its market share and therefore it was nee-
essary to introduce another new beer with a sharper taste. That is why "Super Dry
was introduced in spite of the fact that it would cannibalize "Koku-Kire 's market
share. In other words, by introduction of the two new products with similar taste,
Asahi tried to expand the market for a beer with sharp taste.
Moreover, Asahi spent an extraordinary amount of money on advertising. Hitherto,
Asahi ensured a certain level of operating pro丘t and then determined their advertising
budget. Therefore, advertisement of Asahi often declined after strong summer sales
receded. However, Asahi's new president said that the company could pump money in
advertising until operating profit went down to zero. In 1986, advertising expenses
increased 50% over the previous year.
Asahi also invested in plant and equipment aggressively. In the brewing industry,
it takes more than one year to expand capacity of even an existing factory. Therefore,
the decision of expansion in 1988 was made in the spring of 1987, when it was still un-
certain how much "Super Dry would be sold. According to industry norms, even a
30%　expansion is considered too aggressive, but Asahi expanded capacity by　50%
re
in 1988. As a result, however, when "Super Dry became a hit in 1988, this capacity
expansion enabled Asahi to increase its market share dramatically.
III. ANALYSIS
C D Characteristics of the Brewing Industry
In the Japanese brewing industry, Kirin had expanded its market share from the
end of the second world war until the middle of the 1970's. During that period, other
brewers tried to maintain their market by various efforts, but failed. Kirin's success
was partly due to initial conditions, but mostly due to established reputation that Kirin
beer is the beer of beer lovers. Why, though, did this initial success of Kirin continue
for such a long timer The answer appears to be that in the brewing industry, there
are some factors which enable a large companies to grow larger. The factors which
facilitate continued growth of market leader (hereafter referred to as "market leader
advantages') are as follows :
The丘rst factor is concerned with the pattern of consumption. An industry study
〃
showed that the top three reasons for brand selection are quality, "past drinking
habit,' and "reputation (Katayama; 1972). In other words, beer is purchased custom-
arily and in the industry there is externality in consumption.　This externality
appears because beer consumption by beer lovers or heavy drinkers influences drinking
habits of other people. Therefore, initial popularity for Kinn increased the demand
for Kinn.
The second factor is about taste. The taste of beer is deteriorated as beer gets
old. So, brewers try to supply as fresh beer as possible. This is called "fresh rotation.
A larger brewer can enjoy a faster turnover in inventory and keep beer fresher. Such
a brewer realizes fresh rotation naturally. Since Kirin beer was always in demand, it
remained fresh which in turn leads to further increase in demand.
In advertisement, there are also market leader advantages. Advertisement is not
effective without a certain level of expense regardless of the sales volume. This means
that advertisement is more advantageous for the larger brewer. In addition, popular
products advertise themselves. Popular brands occupy prime shelf space and are ex･
posed to consumers.
The final factor concerns rebates. Although producers give rebates to wholesalers,
rebates from wholesalers to retailers are larger and, therefore, more important m the
Japanese brewing industry. There are two kinds of wholesalers in the industry. One
is the general wholesalers that deal with all brands of beer, and the other is the ex-
elusive wholesalers that deal with only a single brand. Wholesalers give retailers
higher rebates for the slower moving brands than for the popular brands. This rebate
structure丘nancially weakens the exclusive wholesalers that deal with an unpopular
brand. On the other hand, the general wholesalers do not want to push the slow
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selling brands because of higher′ rebates for them, and as a result, promotional efforts
are concentrated on popular brands. Therefore, popular brands enjoy strong support
from the wholesalers.
Using the above four factors, we can understand why Kinn could continue their
initial success. Once Kirin beer established a good reputation ; ㊨ Kirin drinkers became
repeat customers and other brand drinkers switched to Kirin, ㊨ Kirin beer became
fresher with high inventory turnover rate, ⑨ more consumers recognized Kirin beer
because of leading market share, ㊨ wholesalers pushed Kirin beer because of its popu-
larity.
( 2 ) The Change of the Competitive Patterns
In the Japanese brewing industry, there are some market leader advantages. Other
than beer, there are several industries with a tendency towards concentration. In those
industries, there are other market leader advantages such as experience e庁ect or net･
work externality (Henderson; 1979, Katz and Shapiro; 1985). Although it seems to be
di伍cult for smaller players to succeed in an industry with these advantages, Asahi
succeeded in expanding its market share by introduction of new beer. It is probable
that radical technological innovation caused the change in such an industry, however,
Asahi's new products were not based on technological change. Why did Asahi succeed?
What differentiates "Koku-Kire" and "Super Dry from Asahi's former new products?
In order to answer these questions, we must compare "Super Dry with the three
former new products, "Asahi Steiny,' draft beer, and mini barrel in terms of competi-
tive patterns.
We characterize competitive patterns in the three points.
( a) Attractiveness: material, size, or shape of containers vs. taste
( b ) Industry leader's reaction : follow vs. ignore
(c ) Result : market expansion vs. market share change
II
The attractiveness of "Steiny was its strange shape and small size of the bottle.
a;
Kirin ignored this challenge. "Steiny expanded the beer market, but the market share
in the industry did not change. As to draft beer, Asahi emphasized the taste, "fresh."
Kirin had not introduced draft beer for a long time. Draft beer did not caused either
market expansion or change of the market share so much. Mini barrel attracted
people's attention in terms of its strange shape. Kinn followed Asahi in a few years.
Mini barrel expanded the beer market slightly, however, Kirin won the "Container War'
because of its strong sales force, so the market share did not change radically. The
attractiveness of "Super Dry is its different taste from lager beer. Kirin introduced
its own dry-type beer when it was clear that "Super Dry sold well. "Super Dry and
``Dry War made the beer market grow again and Asahi's market share increased
dramatically.
According to this comparison, the new product in cell C in丘gure 3, whose attrac･
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tiveness is taste and leader's reaction to which is to follow, is considered to have the
potential to change the market share. In order to understand the reason for this, we
make a simple model of the competition in the industry.
Suppose that two firms, A and K, are competing in the beer market. Firm K
attracts beer lovers and it enjoys a good reputation that K's beer is good beer because
beer lovers select brand K. Because of the reputation, drinkers other than beer lovers
drink K's beer, and firm K has a much larger market share than　丘rm A. Initially,
氏rm A introduces a new product, and gets some market. However, because of K's
strong reputation,丘rm K may absorb the market of the new product with time. As a
result,丘rm Ks market share may not decrease. Moreover, the market share may
increase because丘rm K absorbs the market newly exploited by A's new product.
However, suppose that the extent of absorption depends on how much K's reputa-
tion was deteriorated initially. It is considered that deterioration of K's reputation
depends on how many beer lovers drink the new beer, that is, how much the new
product substitutes for K's existing product (Remember drinkers of K's existing product
are regarded as beer lovers). When substitution is very large, that is, when the beer
lovers switch their favorite brand, the other drinkers consider that the new beer is
better than K's existing beer. Therefore, A enjoy貞the good reputation, K's reputation
is deteriorated, and absorption becomes small.
The market of firm A's new product consists of the three parts. First, firm A's
new product exploits a potential market which we denote with Na. Secondly, the
product substitutes firm K's existing product denoted by bSたM｡ (0<6<l). S* is K's
market share, and M｡ is the market size before introduction of the new product. The
value of ∂ is determined by the power of the new product to substitute K's existing
product. Third, the new product cannibalizes A's existing product and we denote this
with cSaM｡ (0<c<l). Sa is A's market share and the value of c is determined by the
power of the new product to cannibalize. Therefore, the market of A's new product is
Na + bSkM｡ +cSaM｡.
In such a competitive situation, the reason people are attracted to a new beer is
an important factor. When the new beer attracts drinkers because of good taste, b
(substitution) is considered to be large, since beer lovers are sensitive to taste or quality
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(Remember the top reason for brand selection is ``quality' in the industry study referr-
ed before). On the contrary, when attractiveness of the new beer is due to novelty of
the container, in other words, when the brewers propose a new way of drinking with
the new container, Na (exploitation of new demand) may be large. However, b is small
because the drinkers of K, beer lovers, are sensitive to taste but not to container.
Therefore, in case of new beer with new taste, substitution is larger and absorption is
smaller.
Moreover, different reaction of the leader brings di庁erent result. If the leader
ignores the new product, the substitution of it for K's existing product is only bSkM｡.
However, if leader K follows A and introduces a new product, the market of K's new
product is Nt+bSaM｡+cShM｡. So, the substitution of the new product (of the two com-
panies) for K's existing product expands to bSkM｡+cSkM｡, so the leader's power of
absorption becomes weak. Therefore, only the new product in cell C in　丘gure　3　can
change market share.
When Asahi introduced Super Dry, it emphasized that the taste was completely
di庁erent from Kirin lager beer and that new beer lovers should have select the new
リ
taste. On the other hand, Asahi's former new products such as "Steiny and mini
barrel mainly exploited new demand. Moreover, Kirin, which had ignored Asahi's
challenges of ``Steiny and draft beer, followed Asahi in case of "Super Dry." That
may be because Kirin was anxious about the low growth rate of the market and its
own sales. Consequently, at that time, the competitive pattern of the industry was
changed.
Once Asahi won the competition and attracted beer lovers, some of market leader
advantages made Asahi's share increase rapidly. When Asahi established the reputation
that new beer lovers select "Super Dry,' Asahi drinkers became repeat customers and
other brand drinkers switched to Asahi. Asahi could keep its beer tasty because of
fresh rotation. "Super Dry　∝cupied prime shelf space and advertised itself. Therefore,
the industrial characteristics, which previously contributed to Kinn's dominance, caused
Asahi's great success' .
There are several other reasons for Asahi s success such as Asahi's new product
development oriented to drinkers'taste, introduction of similar new products one after
the other (this means larger bSkM｡ than if only one product is introduced), tremendous
advertising expense, and aggressive capacity expansion. However, these efforts of Asahi
would not have been effective without the change of competitive patterns. Therefore,
the change of competitive patterns is the most essential reason for the market change.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Asahi s challenge was not based on the technological change but on the new product
concept. Asahi could propose the new concept because it doubted the basic assump-
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tion of the industry- Kirin's legacy of strength. In addition to Asahi's challenge,
Kinn's reaction changed. So the competitive pattern was changed and Asahi's market
share increased dramatically.
Other than the change of product concept, Asahi paid attentions to product quality
and expanded its capacity aggressively. With these things, Asahi established the reputa-
tion that its beer is good beer and the beer of beer lovers. Interestingly, what Asahi
did is associated with what Kirin did after the second world war. It seems that the
key factors for success in the brewing industry do not change and that the industrial
characteristics favorable for a leader or a winner are in月uential even now.
With Asahi's success as momentum, the reputation about which brand is the beer
of beer lovers became undetermined like in 1950's. As a result, the brewers are now
making strong promotional efforts in order to establish their reputation. They are also
developing various kinds of new beer in search of a new standard instead of Kirin's
lager beer. This movement has revitalized the matured industry and caused the beer
market to grow again.
Why could Asahi doubt the basic assumption of the industry and make the new
concept work? The answer is considered that the new concept is the fruit of Asahi's
experiences with failure. In 1960's, Asahi gave various challenges to Kirin. However,
at that time, Asahi gave m to the basic assumption that Kirin's lager beer was the
beer of beer lovers, and instead tried various strategies for growth other than a chal-
lenge m taste. As a result, these strategies failed, and the only unexploited area for
competition was basic assumption.
When the history of the Japanese brewing industry is viewed in this manner, we
can regard an industry as the丘eld of learning through competition between individual
firms. "Learning in this context, is to pursue a right answer by eliminating alternatives
sequentially. Followers challenge a leading丘rm with one of the alternative ways of
competition such as imitation, advertisement, promotion, and so on. When the selected
strategy is found to be ineffective, followers challenge with the other way of competi-
tion. With these challenges repeated, followers may be able to find a right answer,
that is, an effective way of competition. This view of an industry may be useful to
study the behavior of the firm, change of competitive patterns, and evolution of the
industry (Nelson and Winter; 1982, Reinganum; 1985).
It is possible to draw some similarities between the Japanese brewing industry and
the U. S. automobile industry. Abernathy (1978) found that in the initial phase of the
automobile industry, there are major innovations in search of a dominant design. He
also found that once the dominant design was determined, major innovations were
replaced by minor ones and the industry matured. A dominant design in Abernathy's
study corresponds to the basic assumption in this paper, and minor innovations corre-
spond to Asahi's various challenges in the 1960's.
Although there are some similarities, there also is a major difference between the
m
REVITALIZATION OF THE JAPANESE BREWING INDUSTRY (Asaba)
case presented in this paper and existing studies about industrial dematurity. In the
existing studies about dematunty driven by technological change, it is often said that
a large incumbent declined because it overlooked new technology and stuck to existing
technology (Foster; 1986). On the contrary, Kirin failed in spite of immediately follow-
ing Asahi's lead. Kirin's aggressive reaction neutralized its advantage of reputation.
The leader's optimal reaction to the follower's challenge in the dematurity of an in-
dustry is one promising research areaO
NOTES
(1) In this paper, "leader" and "follower" mean a market share leader and a market share
follower. They do not correspond to strategic types in the text of marketing strategy such
as Kotler (1980).
C 2 ) For example, dematurity of the watch industry was caused by new technologies. See Shintaku
and Kuwada (1989).
( 3 ) This case was written based on interviewing and published literatures below.
Ishiyama, J., Asahi Beer no Chosen (The Challenge of Asahi Breweries), Nihon Noritsu
Kyokai, 1988 (in Japanese).
Kirin Breweries, Kirin Beer no Rekishi (The History of Kirin Breweries), 1969, 1985.
(4) Rebates for Asahi beer do not become small so soon. However, it is said that rebates for
Kirin beer increased, so the strength of Kirin concerned with rebates weakened.
(5 ) Game theoretic analysis seems to be e庁ective to study the leader's optimal reaction to the
follower's challenge. One possibility is shown in Asaba (1990).
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